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In several recent decisions involving foreign banking organizations, the
Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System (the "Board"
or "Federal Reserve Board") has expressed concern about capital levels.
More specifically, the Board has worried that some foreign banking or-
ganizations possess lower capital-to-assets ratios than do their U.S. coun-
terparts. A typical Board statement has been as follows: "In evaluating
this application, the Board noted that the primary capital ratio of Appli-
cant, as publicly reported, is well below the capital guidelines for U.S.
multinational bank holding companies."'
This article examines the foreign bank capital problem perceived by
the Board. In Part I, the pertinent Board pronouncements and decisions
on foreign banking organizations are reviewed. The concerns of the Board,
and of the other U.S. banking regulators, about capital levels in general
are covered in Part I1. In Part III, the international environment is briefly
discussed. Finally, in Part IV, some general thoughts on the role of capital
in bank supervision and regulation are presented. The article concludes
with a recommendation that the Board continue its case-by-case handling
of the issue of the capital levels of foreign banking organizations. 2
*Member, Virginia and D.C. Bars; principal, Golembe Assoc., Inc.
1. The Sanwa Bank Limited, 71 FED. RES. BULL. 117, 118 (Feb. 1985).
2. A certain hubris, or at least a particular viewpoint, is involved in referring to non-U.S.
banking organizations as "foreign banking organizations." Nevertheless, several factors
support the use of the term. One is that from the standpoint of the major protagonist of this
work, the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, non-U.S. banking
organizations are "foreign." Another is that the author of the paper is a U.S. citizen and
consequently also views non-U.S. banking organizations as "foreign." But perhaps most
important, "foreign" is a much less stilted term than is "non-U.S.", and given the number
of times either one or the other term would have to appear in any discussion of the capital
of banking organizations that are not predominantly located in the United States, stiltedness
becomes a consideration.
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I. The Federal Reserve Board's
Pronouncements
A. BACKGROUND
The Federal Reserve Board is one of three federal banking regulators
in the United States. The other two are the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). The Federal Reserve Board is the primary regulator of bank
holding companies, which are organizations that own or control banks,3
and of state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System. The OCC is the primary regulator of national banks, and the
FDIC is the primary regulator of federally insured state-chartered banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 4
Foreign banking organizations with, or contemplating, operations in the
United States come into contact with the Federal Reserve Board under
several statutory provisions. Such an organization seeking to acquire a
U.S. bank or bank holding company must apply to the Board under section
3(a)(l) of the Bank Holding Company Act 5 in order to become a bank
holding company as defined in that act. A foreign banking organization
that is already a U.S. bank holding company by virtue of its ownership
or control of a U.S. bank or bank holding company must apply to the
Board under sections 3(a)(3) or (5) of the act if it wishes to acquire another
U.S. bank or bank holding company; 6 and such a foreign banking orga-
nization must apply to the Board under section 4(c)(8) of the act if it
wishes to engage in a section 4(c)(8) activity in the United States. 7 Such
activities are nonbanking activities that the Board has determined to be
closely related to banking.8 Closely related activities are permissible for
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1982). As of December 31, 1984, there were 5,522 bank holding
companies in the United States, with a total of 8,657 bank subsidiaries.
4. As of December 31, 1984, there were: 4,904 national banks, with total assets of $1,498
billion; 1,056 state-chartered member banks, with total assets of $460 billion; and 8,534
state-chartered federally insured nonmember banks, with total assets of $555 billion. The
number of U.S. banks not subject to a federal regulator totalled only ten, according to one
estimate by the FDIC.
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) (1982). The Bank Holding Company Act is codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-1850.
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) and (5) (1982). Section 3(a)(3) concerns the acquisition ofa bank
by a bank holding company. Section 3(a)(5) concerns the acquisition of a bank holding
company by another bank holding company, or a merger between bank holding companies.
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
8. Section 4(c)(8) is the principal, but by no means the only, statutory provision under
which bank holding companies, whether U.S. or foreign-based, can conduct so-called non-
banking activities. Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act contains a number of other
nonbanking provisions. See 12 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). In addition, there are two statutory pro-
visions that permit foreign banking organizations falling under the jurisdiction of the Bank
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U.S. bank holding companies to engage in, provided a particular holding
company's conduct of a particular activity will result in net benefits to
the public. 9
A foreign bank that is not a U.S. bank holding company but that main-
tains a branch or agency in the United States must also seek the Board's
approval under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act to en-
gage in section 4(c)(8) activities in the United States. The reason is that
section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 imposes the nonbanking
restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act on foreign banks with
branches or agencies in the United States.' 0
Finally, foreign banking organizations, either with or without U.S. bank-
ing operations, that wish to establish Edge Act corporations must seek
Federal Reserve Board approval. I I Edge Act corporations are entities
established under the act by that name to engage in international banking
and related activities.' 2 Foreign banking organizations with, or contem-
plating, establishing or acquiring Edge Act corporations will usually also
be subject to the Bank Holding Company Act by virtue of their ownership
or control of U.S. banks or bank holding companies.
For applications under sections 3(a)(l), (3), or (5) of the Bank Holding
Company Act, the Board must, among other factors, consider "the fi-
nancial and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or
companies and the banks concerned."1 3 To engage in a permissible closely
related nonbanking activity under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
Company Act, a banking organization must pass a net public benefits test.
This test is stated in the following manner: 14
In determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to banking or
managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider whether its performance
by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be expected to produce
benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or
Holding Company Act to conduct certain nonbanking activities in the United States. These
provisions are § 2(h) and § 4(c)(9) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h)
(1982) and § 1843(c)(9) (1982). At the risk of oversimplifying, it can be said that these
provisions permit the covered foreign banking organizations to conduct in the United States
nonbanking activities-other than § 4(c)(8) activities, certain securities activities, banking
or financial activities, and a few other activities-provided such activities are part of a
business conducted predominantly outside the United States. Criteria implementing § 2(h)
and § 4(c)(9) are set forth at 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.23(f) and (g) (1986).
9. The Board approves § 4(c)(8) activities by regulation, or by order in individual cases.
Activities approved by regulation are listed in Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. Part 225; the laundry
list of permissible activities is at 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1986).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 3106 (1982).
II. 12 U.S.C. § 619 (1982).
12. The Edge Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1982).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
SUMMER 1986
788 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue con-
centration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest,
or unsound banking practices.
Financial factors would appear to be subsumed within the unsound bank-
ing practices category.
The Edge Act is much less specific than are the preceding statutory
provisions on the matter of standards for approval of applications. The
purposes of the act are to provide for federally-chartered and supervised
entities engaging in international banking and financial activities. The
Board is required to issue rules and regulations in furtherance of the
statute's purposes and to review and revise such regulations at least once
every five years "in order to ensure that such purposes are being served
in light of prevailing economic conditions and banking practices."15
B. 1979 STATEMENT
In early 1979, the Federal Reserve Board issued a policy statement
entitled, "Statement of Policy on Supervision and Regulation of Foreign
Bank Holding Companies." 16 The statement, issued on February 23, 1979,
is still outstanding. It was the result of a review of the Board's supervisory
and regulatory policies concerning foreign bank holding companies. The
Board cited as major elements underlying the review (I) the growth in
the number and total assets of U.S. banks owned by foreign organizations
and (2) the experience the Board had gained in regulating foreign bank
holding companies since the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act. 17
The Board also noted that as the review was being conducted, Congress
passed the International Banking Act of 1978.18 This act expanded the
Board's responsibilities concerning the operations of foreign banks in the
United States. The act also established certain legislative policies-the
primary one being the policy of national treatment-concerning the U.S.
operations of foreign banking organizations. Under the national treatment
policy, the United States committed to treat foreign banking organizations
with or desiring operations in the United States in the same manner as it
treats U.S. banking organizations. An antithesis of national treatment is
reciprocity. Under a reciprocity policy toward foreign banking organi-
zations, a country would treat the banking organizations from a particular
nation in the same manner as that nation treats the first country's own
banking organizations.
15. 12 U.S.C. § 611 a (1982).
16. See I FED. REs. RE,. SER. 1 4-835 (1979).
17. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1763 (1970).
18. Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 613 (1978).
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Capital levels or ratios were not a particular focus of the 1979 statement.
The Board's concerns were broad and not expressed quantitatively: "the
Board believes that in general foreign banks seeking to establish banks
or other banking operations in the United States should meet the same
general standards of strength, experience and reputation as required for
domestic organizers of banks and bank holding companies." 19
On the other hand, the Board noted the different banking practices and
traditions in other countries and the different legal and social environ-
ments in which foreign banking organizations operate. The Board also
noted the limits of its concerns. Its supervisory responsibilities were for
the safety and soundness of U.S. banking operations. Interest in the
operations and activities of foreign banking organizations outside the United
States were "limited to their possible effects on the ability of those banks
to support their operations inside the United States." 20 Whenever a for-
eign banking organization sought to acquire a U.S. banking organization,
the Board stated that it would "seek to assure itself of the foreign bank's
ability to be a source of financial and managerial strength and support to
the U.S. subsidiary bank." 2' In making this determination, the Board
would "analyze the financial condition of the foreign organization, eval-
uate the record and integrity of management, assess the role and standing
of the bank in its home country, and request the views of the bank reg-
ulatory authorities in the home country." 22
Capital was mentioned, but not in isolation and only in the context of
information that would be required of the foreign applicant. The Board
stated that reports would be required to provide sufficient information to
permit an assessment of the foreign organization's financial strength and
operating performance. The reports would be "prepared in accordance
with local practices together with an explanation and reconciliation of
major differences between local accounting standards and U.S. generally
accepted accounting procedures including full information on earnings,
capital, charge-offs, and reserves." 23
C. BOARD DECISIONS IN 1983
The Board has issued a number of decisions involving foreign banking
organizations in the years since the promulgation of the 1979 policy state-
ment. It was not until 1983, however, that capital began to surface in the
decisions as a major preoccupation.
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I. The Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan, 1983
An indication of growing interest in capital on the part of the Board
was provided by an August 23, 1983, decision. 24 The applicant was The
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Limited, Tokyo, Japan. It applied under
section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act to acquire a de novo
limited-purpose trust company, LTCB Trust Company, New York, New
York. The Long-Term Credit Bank had assets of approximately $50.7
billion, making it the seventh largest private bank in Japan and the thirty-
fifth largest bank in the world. Its principal business was the extension
of long-term credit in the form of secured loans, discounts, and guarantees.
Under a 1982 revision in the Japanese Banking Law, it could also under-
write and sell central and local government bonds and government-guar-
anteed bonds.
Because it had a branch in New York and an agency in Los Angeles,
The Long-Term Credit Bank was subject in the United States to the
nonbanking restrictions of section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act.2 5
Consequently, it had to apply to the Board to engage in the trust and
fiduciary business, a business the Board has found permissible for bank
holding companies under section 4(c)(8) of that act. 2 6
In its decision, the Board noted that The Long-Term Credit Bank's
capitalization was below that of comparable U.S. banking organizations.
There were mitigating circumstances, however:
Although Applicant's capitalization is below the standards for comparably sized
banking organizations in the United States, there appear to be substantial dif-
ferences between Applicant's business and that conducted by large U.S. banks,
particularly with respect to its asset and liability status, that mitigate the Board's
concerns in this regard. 27
In particular, the Board noted that the Japanese organization's investment
in the New York trust company represented only 0.27 percent of the
former's equity capital and reserves and less than 0.01 percent of its total
assets. In addition, the trust company would be providing fiduciary rather
than banking services. The Board apparently viewed fiduciary activities
as being less risky than banking activities.
2. Fuji Bank, /983
The Board's concern about the capital adequacy of foreign banking
organizations came to the fore in late 1983. In December of that year, the
24. The Long-Term Credit Bank o 'Japan, Limited, 69 FiE. Ris. Bui[,i. 735 (Sept. 1983).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982); .ee 12 U.S.C. § 3106 (1982).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(3) (1986).
27. 69 Fi n. Ris. Buii.. 736 (Sept. 1983).
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Board issued three decisions involving foreign banking organizations in
which it gave prominent play to capital matters.
The first decision, issued on December 20, 1983, involved an application
by Fuji Bank, Limited, Tokyo, Japan, to acquire most of the nonbanking
operations of Walter E. Heller International Corporation.2 8 Fuji's appli-
cation was under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act. Fuji
was a U.S. bank holding company by virtue of its ownership of the Fuji
Bank and Trust Company, New York. It also had a branch in Chicago,
agencies in New York and Los Angeles, representative offices in Atlanta,
Houston, Seattle, and San Francisco, and an Edge Act corporation in San
Francisco. Fuji had assets of $99.8 billion and was ranked as the thirteenth
largest commercial banking organization in the world. It was the second
largest commercial banking organization in Japan.
Walter E. Heller International Corporation was a U.S. bank holding
company by virtue of its ownership of American National Bank, Chicago.
Fuji desired to acquire a subsidiary of Walter E. Heller International
Corporation, Walter E. Heller and Company. As a result of the transac-
tion, Fuji would engage in the following nonbank activities: commercial
financing and servicing; real estate financing and servicing; leasing; real
estate appraisal and investment advisory services; the provision of credit-
related insurance; and arranging equity financing for certain types of in-
come-producing properties.
In its decision, the Board noted that Fuji's primary capital ratio as
publicly reported was "well below the Board's capital guidelines for U.S.
multinational bank holding companies." 29 At that time, the guideline for
the ratio of primary capital to assets for U.S. multinational bank holding
companies was five percent. 30 Nevertheless, the Board stated that after
reviewing all the facts of record it had determined that the financial factors
relating to the application were consistent with approval. The following
caveat was given, however: 3'
In making this determination, the Board notes that the application raises the
general question of whether the capital standards applicable to domestic bank
holding companies should also be applied to foreign banking organizations mak-
ing acquisitions in the United States, including the acquisition of nonbanking
companies. This question presents a number of complex issues which the Board
believes require careful consideration and which the Board has under review.
Concerning the determination that the financial factors relating to the
application were consistent with approval, the Board stated that it took
into account the nonbanking nature of Fuji's acquisition.
28. Fuji Bank, Limited, 70 FED. RES. BUiLL. 50 (Jan. 1984).
29. 70 FED. RES. BULL. 50-51 (Jan. 1984).
30. See 69 FED. RES. BULL. 539 (July 1983).
31. 70 FED. RES. BULL. 51 (Jan. 1984).
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3. Korea First Bank, 1983, and The
Commercial Bank of Korea, 1983
On December 21, 1983, the Board approved two applications by Korean
banking organizations to establish de novo banks in the United States.
The applicant in one of the decisions was Korea First Bank, of Seoul. 32
Korea First was the fourth largest commercial banking institution in
Korea. It had a branch in Chicago and agencies in New York and Los
Angeles. The new institution that Korea First Bank wished to establish
would be located in New York City and would provide a full range of
commercial banking services. Korea First's application was under section
3(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act, the section requiring an ap-
plication by an organization seeking to become a bank holding company.
In its decision, the Board described Korea First Bank's primary capital
ratio as being below the minimum capital guidelines for U.S. multinational
bank holding companies. The Board found offsetting considerations, how-
ever. The new bank would be small in relation to the parent organization
and would be strongly capitalized. Moreover, the Board stated that it
expected the new bank to be maintained "among the more strongly cap-
italized banking organizations of comparable size in the United States." '33
The Board noted that it was studying the general question of whether
foreign banking organizations with U.S. banking operations should be
subject to the capital standards applicable to domestic bank holding
companies.
The other Korean institution concerning which the Board issued a de-
cision on December 21, 1983, was The Commercial Bank of Korea, Ltd.,
also of Seoul. 34 The application was under section 3(a)(l) of the Bank
Holding Company Act. The Commercial Bank desired to become a bank
holding company by acquiring a de novo bank, Korea Commercial Bank
of New York. The Commercial Bank was the second largest bank engaged
in the general banking business in Korea. In the United States, it had
agencies in New York and Los Angeles and a limited purpose non-insured
branch office in Chicago. The new institution would offer a full range of
commercial banking services in the New York banking market.
The Board's decision was very similar to its decision on Korea First
Bank. The Board noted that the primary capital ratio of The Commercial
Bank of Korea was below the minimum capital guidelines for U.S. mul-
tinational bank holding companies. But the regulator found offsetting con-
siderations. The new bank would be small in relation to the parent or-
ganization. It would be strongly capitalized initially. And it would be
32. Korea First Bank, 70 FED. RES. BULL. 43 (Jan. 1984).
33. 70 FED. RES. BULL. 44 (January 1984).
34. The Commercial Bank of Korea, Ltd., 70 FED. RES. BULL. 35 (Jan. 1984).
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maintained in a comparatively strong capitalized position after it began
operations.
As in the Korea First Bank decision, the Board noted that it was con-
sidering the general question of whether the capital standards applicable
to domestic bank holding companies should be applied to foreign banking
organizations with U.S. banking operations.
D. THE 1984 MEMORANDUM
The next Board document on the capital adequacy of foreign banking
organizations with U.S. banking operations was a memorandum by the
Board's staff dated February 1, 1984 (the 1984 Memorandum). 35 The
memorandum, entitled "Relevance of domestic capital adequacy consid-
erations to foreign banks seeking to make acquisitions in the United States,"
was the subject of a rather inconclusive discussion at a February 2, 1984,
meeting of the Board of Governors.
According to the 1984 Memorandum, the question of the capital ade-
quacy of foreign banking organizations was being raised in two contexts.
First, in section 908(b) of the recently passed International Lending Su-
pervision Act of 1983,36 the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and
the Secretary of the Treasury were directed to work with other countries
to strengthen the capital bases of international banks. The precise lan-
guage was as follows: 37
The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the Secretary of the Treasury shall encourage governments, central banks, and
regulatory authorities of other major banking countries to work toward main-
taining and, where appropriate, strengthening the capital bases of banking in-
stitutions involved in international lending.
The International Lending Supervision Act was in large measure a
response to the international debt crisis that surfaced in August of 1982
when Mexico made known its debt servicing problems. Parenthetically,
and as will be noted in Section II of this paper, the International Lending
Supervision Act has provided a major impetus for the recent interest of
the three federal banking agencies in capital. Section 908(a) of the act
directs the federal banking agencies to "cause banking institutions to
achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of
35. Memorandum, Relevance of domestic capital adequacy considerations to foreign
banks seeking to make acquisitions in the United States, From the Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation To the Board of Governors, Feb. I, 1984 [hereinafter cited as
1984 Memorandum)].
36. Pub. L. No. 98-181, Title IX, 97 Stat. 1278 (1983).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 3907(b)(3)(C) (1982).
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capital for such banking institutions and by using such other methods as
the appropriate Federal banking agency deems appropriate. 38
The second context, according to the 1984 Memorandum, within which
the question of the capital adequacy of foreign banking organizations was
arising concerned acquisitions in the United States by such institutions.
In particular, questions were developing about the extent to which U.S.
numerical capital standards should be applied to foreign institutions mak-
ing U.S. acquisitions.
These questions in turn arose because in mid-1983 the Board and the
OCC issued guidelines concerning the minimum capital standards for the
largest U.S. banking organizations, termed multinational banking orga-
nizations. These guidelines called for, among other things, the mainte-
nance of a minimum primary capital to assets ratio of 5 percent for U.S.
multinational banking organizations. Safety and soundness reasons, and
competitive equity reasons, caused the Board to ponder about applying
similar standards to foreign banking organizations seeking to make U.S.
acquisitions.
The Board's staff mentioned the conflicting considerations. The guide-
lines of the Board and the OCC were adopted in the context of the par-
ticular U.S. environment. Elements of this environment include U.S.
accounting principles and the risk factors, banking laws, and banking
regulations peculiar to the United States. These environmental factors
might not be similar in other countries. In addition, foreign banking or-
ganizations and foreign governments might view the application of U.S.
domestic capital adequacy guidelines to foreign banks as "an inappro-
priate application of U.S. bank supervisory standards." 39
A major consideration on the other side was the U.S. supervisory in-
terest in the condition of a foreign owner of a U.S. banking organization.
"The foreign bank parent would be looked to as the ultimate source of
strength in the event that its U.S. banking operations required support." '40
It should be noted that this attitude could be considered somewhat of an
alteration from the Board's 1979 policy statement. There, the Board stated
that its supervisory concerns about the operations and activities of foreign
banks outside the United States were "limited to their possible effects
on the ability of those banks to support their operations inside the United
States." 4 1 In the 1984 Memorandum, the Board's staff might have been
implying that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make supervisory concerns
following national boundaries. That is, implementing a U.S. supervisory
38. 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a) (1982).
39. 1984 Memorandum, supra note 35.
40. Id.
41. 1 FED. RES. REG. SER. $ 4-835 (1979).
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interest in the operations and activities of foreign banking organizations,
while trying to limit the implementation to only those operations and
activities affecting the ability of such organizations to support their U.S.
banking operations, might be too much of a task.
Supporting the argument that there might be a difference in attitude
between the 1979 policy statement and the 1984 Memorandum is the
following language from the latter document: "the problems suffered by
the parent could well have an effect on the safety and soundness of the
U.S. operations." 42 The term "problems" would seem to encompass any
problems, whether U.S. related or non-U.S. related, affecting the ability
of a foreign banking organization to support its U.S. operations.
The 1984 Memorandum presented the Board with three possible ap-
proaches: (1) the Board could continue to analyze potential foreign bank
acquirers or establishers of U.S. operations on a case-by-case basis, using
the 1979 policy statement; (2) the Board could request comment on the
extent to which domestic minimum quantitative capital standards should
be applied to foreign banking organizations seeking to make acquisitions
in the United States; or (3) the Board could institute consultations with
foreign bank supervisors on capital standards for international banking
organizations. The discussion at the meeting at which the Board consid-
ered the memorandum was inconclusive. In effect, however, the Board
seems to have opted for all three alternatives. It has continued to judge
applications by foreign banking organizations on a case-by-case basis. It
sought, in conjunction with an application by The Mitsubishi Bank to
acquire BanCal Tri-State Corporation, comments on the general issue of
the capital adequacy of foreign banking organizations with U.S. banking
operations. And it has indicated that it is pursuing the issue of capital
adequacy with bank supervisory authorities in other countries. The re-
quest for comments in conjunction with the Mitsubishi application was
actually issued prior to the submission of the 1984 Memorandum to the
Board.
E. BOARD DECISIONS IN 1984
I. The Mitsubishi Bank, 1984
On May 14, 1984, the Board approved, in a four to two decision, the
acquisition of BanCal Tri-State Corporation, San Francisco, by The Mit-
subishi Bank, Limited, Tokyo, Japan. 43 BanCal was the parent holding
company of The Bank of California, National Association. The Mitsubishi
42. 1984 Memorandum, supra note 35.
43. The Mitsubishi Bank, Limited, 70 FED. RES. BULl. 518 (June 1984).
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Bank had total assets of $97.1 billion and was the third largest commercial
banking organization in Japan. Worldwide, it ranked number twelve. In
the United States, it operated branches in New York and Chicago, and
an agency in Los Angeles. It also owned the twenty-first largest com-
mercial banking organization in California, The Mitsubishi Bank of
California.
BanCal Tri-State, with total assets of $3.8 billion, was the eighth largest
banking organization in California. It was one of only two national banks
with branches in more than one state. In addition to sixteen branches in
California, it had three branches in Washington and one in Oregon. These
branches were established prior to February 25, 1927, and were thus
grandfathered under the McFadden Act.
44
The application was considered by the Board primarily under section
3(a)(3) of the Bank Holding Company Act. Since The Mitsubishi Bank
already had a U.S. bank subsidiary, it was a U.S. bank holding company.
Its application was to acquire an additional U.S. banking organization.
The Edge Act also played a part in the Board's review because the BanCal
organization included an Edge Act corporation.
The transaction raised several issues, but the predominant one in the
Board's view, and the one that gave rise to the two dissenting votes,
concerned capital. The majority's decision began the consideration of the
capital issue in a general manner. The principles of national treatment and
competitive equity were cited as requiring that foreign banks seeking to
establish or acquire U.S. banking operations meet the same general stan-
dards expected of U.S. banking organizations. Offsetting considerations
mentioned by the majority were different regulatory and supervisory re-
quirements, accounting principles, asset quality standards, and banking
practices and traditions. All of these elements produce a different envi-
ronment for foreign banking organizations and make comparisons "of the
capital positions of foreign and domestic banks" difficult. 45 The Board
then stated:46
The appropriate balancing of these concerns raises a number of complex
issues that the Board believes require careful consideration and that the Board
has currently under review. In this regard, the Board has initiated consultations
with appropriate foreign bank supervisors and notes that work is currently in
progress among foreign and domestic bank supervisory officials to develop more
fully the concept of functional equivalency of capital ratios for banks of different
countries. Pending the outcome of these consultations and deliberations, the
Board has determined to consider the issues raised by applications by foreign
banks to acquire domestic banks on a case-by-case basis.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
45. 70 FED. RES. BULL. 519 (June 1984).
46. Id.
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After going through these preliminaries, the Board was ready for the
specifics of the Mitsubishi situation. The publicly reported primary capital
ratio of The Mitsubishi Bank was characterized as "well below the Board's
capital guidelines for U.S. multinational bank holding companies." 47 This
was a negative factor, but the Board found several mitigating factors. One
set of these factors was the satisfaction with The Mitsubishi Bank indi-
cated by Japanese supervisory authorities. The Board stated that the bank
was in compliance with the capital and other financial requirements of
those authorities. In addition, those authorities viewed the bank's re-
sources and prospects as satisfactory. Other factors listed by the Board
were: a satisfactory record of operation by The Mitsubishi Bank in its
local markets; a history of relatively low loan losses; a comparatively
stable and substantial deposit base; a strong liquidity position; and a
substantial portfolio of securities of publicly held Japanese companies.
Regarding the latter factor, the Board stated that the securities were car-
ried on The Mitsubishi Bank's books at cost, which was substantially
below their market value.
A final set of factors cited by the Board consisted of commitments made
by The Mitsubishi Bank. In general, The Mitsubishi Bank committed to
maintain The Bank of California as a "strong and particularly well cap-
italized banking organization." 48 This general commitment encompassed
another commitment by The Mitsubishi Bank to increase the capital ratio
of The Bank of California to such a level that the latter would be among
the more strongly capitalized banks of comparable size in the country.
This level was much above the Board's minimum capital standard. The
Mitsubishi Bank also committed to maintain this capital level once it was
reached.
The dissenting votes on the transaction were cast by Board Vice Chair-
man Preston Martin and Governor Emmett Rice. They said that foreign
banking organizations with low capital positions "may have an unfair
competitive advantage in the United States over comparably sized do-
mestic banking organizations that are required to maintain a higher capital
level." 49 The lower capital requirements of the foreign institutions gave
them a "clear advantage in many aspects of their competition with do-
mestic banking organizations, including pricing of services and bidding
for domestic bank acquisitions."
50
Governors Martin and Rice concluded that the principles of competitive
equality and national treatment called for applying the same standards to
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 70 FED. RES. BULL. 520 (June 1984).
50. Id.
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both U.S. and foreign banking organizations seeking to make acquisitions
within the Board's jurisdiction. One such standard should be the Board's
capital adequacy guidelines. Since a "domestic banking organization with
a capital and financial position comparable to Applicant's would not be
permitted to make this acquisition," 5 1 Governors Martin and Rice would
have denied the application.
2. Bank of Montreal, 1984
In what it termed a "difficult decision," the Board in July of 1984
approved the applications of the Bank of Montreal, Montreal, Canada,
to acquire Harris Bankcorp, Inc., Chicago, Illinois. 52 The Board's ap-
proval was announced on July 25, 1984, and a statement explaining the
approval was released on July 27, 1984. The difficulty perceived by the
Board concerned capital.
The Bank of Montreal had total assets of approximately $50.8 billion.
It was the third largest bank in Canada and the thirty-fourth largest com-
mercial banking organization in the world. In the United States it had
bank subsidiaries in New York and California, a branch in New York,
and an agency in San Francisco.
The primary statutory provision governing the transaction was either
section 3(a)(3) or section 3(a)(5)-the Board did not specify which-of
the Bank Holding Company Act. Since it had U.S. bank subsidiaries,
Bank of Montreal was already a U.S. bank holding company. Section
4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act and the Edge Act also were
involved because Harris Bankcorp had direct or indirect subsidiaries or-
ganized under these provisions.
In order to comply with the home state requirements of the International
Banking Act and the Board's Regulation K, 53 Bank of Montreal would
convert its bank subsidiaries in New York and California to nondeposit
trust companies. In addition, the bank's New York branch, which was
not grandfathered under section 5(b) of the International Banking Act,54
would conform its deposit-taking operations to those permissible for cor-
porations organized under section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act, sec-
tion 25(a) being the Edge Act. The Board concluded that these changes
would remove any impediments to the acquisition posed by section 5(a)
of the International Banking Act and section 3(d) of the Bank Holding
Company Act. 55
51. Id.
52. Bank of Montreal, 70 FED. RES. BULL. 664 (Aug. 1984).
53. 12 U.S.C. § 3103 (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 211.22 (1986).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 3103(b) (1982).
55. Section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act is the Douglas Amendment, which
restricts the interstate banking activities of bank holding companies (12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)).
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Harris Bankcorp had assets of approximately $7.8 billion. It was the
third largest commercial banking organization in Illinois. Its major sub-
sidiary was Harris Trust and Savings Bank.
In its decision, the Board discussed the general issue of the capital
adequacy of foreign banking organizations in language similar to that used
in The Mitsubishi Bank decision. On the specifics of the Bank of Montreal
application, the Board stated that the primary capital of the institution
after consummation of the proposal would be near the minimum capital
level set forth for U.S. multinational bank holding companies. In per-
forming the calculation, the Board had made certain accounting adjust-
ments to conform to United States banking practice. An adjustment for
Bank of Montreal's specific provision for loan losses was explicitly
mentioned.
The transaction would result in Bank of Montreal's U.S. banking op-
erations amounting to approximately 20 percent of its consolidated world-
wide assets. The Board stated: 56
The Board believes that when a foreign bank's U.S. operations become so
significant in relation to the totality of its activities, its capital and reserves
represent an especially important measure of its ability to serve as a source of
financial strength to its U.S. operations.
The Board concluded that the capital position of the Bank of Montreal
was a negative factor.
Nevertheless, the Board found mitigating circumstances. As in the case
of The Mitsubishi Bank and Japanese supervisory authorities, the Bank
of Montreal was in compliance with the requirements of the Canadian
supervisory authorities, including the capital requirements of those au-
thorities. The Canadian authorities also viewed the bank's resources and
prospects as satisfactory.
The Board noted the Bank of Montreal's large and relatively stable
deposit base, and its satisfactory record of operations in local and inter-
national markets. The bank had initiated a capital program to raise its
capital ratios, and had recently raised new capital amounting to approx-
imately 600 million Canadian dollars.
Bank of Montreal made commitments similar to those made by The
Mitsubishi Bank regarding BanCal Tri-State. The capital ratio of Harris
Bankcorp would be raised to a level significantly above the Board's min-
imum capital standards. The level would be such that Harris Bankcorp
would be among the more strongly capitalized banks of comparable size.
And Bank of Montreal committed to maintain this level of capital once
it had been reached. Still, the case was a close one for the Board: 57
56. 70 FED. RES. BULL. 666 (Aug. 1984).
57. Id.
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Even with the benefit of adjustments for differing financial and legal require-
ments and methodology between United States and Canadian banking organi-
zations, this case presents a difficult decision for the Board, particularly because
of the size of Harris Bankcorp and the relative prominence of Applicants' U.S.
operations. On balance, however, after reviewing the record as it relates to the
overall financial condition of Applicants and their U.S. banking operations,
Applicants' commitments regarding the operation of Harris Bankcorp, the af-
firmations by Canadian supervisory authorities, as well as other facts of record,
the Board believes that Applicants' financial condition is consistent with ap-
proval of this application.
Governor J. Charles Partee dissented from the decision. One of his
grounds for dissent, although seemingly not the most important ground,
was Bank of Montreal's capital position. Governor Partee specifically
mentioned the fact that Bank of Montreal's capital level approximated
only the minimum level set forth in the Board's guidelines.
3. The Sanwa Bank, 1984
On December 18, 1984, the Board approved the application of The
Sanwa Bank Limited, Osaka, Japan, to acquire certain leasing and com-
mercial financing subsidiaries of Continental Illinois Corporation. 58 The
Sanwa Bank had consolidated assets of approximately $106 billion. It was
the fifth largest commercial banking institution in Japan, and the ninth
largest in the world. The Sanwa Bank was a U.S. bank holding company
as a result of its ownership of Golden State Sanwa Bank, San Francisco,
California. The Sanwa Bank also had branches in New York and Chicago,
an agency in San Francisco, and a representative office in Houston.
The application was under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company
Act. The leasing and commercial financing activities of the Continental
Illinois Corporation subsidiaries were among those activities considered
by the Board to be closely related to banking and therefore permissible
for bank holding companies to engage in.
In the decision, the Board reiterated its concern with the general ques-
tion of whether foreign banking organizations should be judged by the
same capital standards as used to judge U.S. banking organizations. The
Board also repeated its position that the issues involved were complex.
And the ongoing consultations with foreign bank supervisors about the
capital question were mentioned.
As for the specifics of the case, the Board stated that the publicly
reported primary capital ratio of The Sanwa Bank was "well below the
capital guidelines for U.S. multinational bank holding companies." 59 As
in The Mitsubishi Bank and Bank of Montreal decisions, however, the
58. The Sanwa Bank Limited, 71 FED. RES. BULL. 117 (Feb. 1985).
59. 71 FED. RES. BULL. 118 (Jan. 1985).
VOL. 20, NO. 3
SYMPOSIUM/FOREIGN BANK CAPITAL & U.S. FED RESERVE BOARD 801
Board found mitigating circumstances. The Sanwa Bank was in compli-
ance with the capital and other financial requirements of the Japanese
supervisory authorities. It had a satisfactory record of operation in its
local market. It had a strong liquidity position. And it had a substantial
portfolio of securities of publicly held Japanese companies. These secu-
rities were carried at book value, which was substantially below their
current market value. The Board concluded that the financial factors
concerning the application were consistent with approval.
Governor Emmett Rice dissented, citing his dissent in The Mitsubishi
Bank decision. In his view, the principles of competitive equality and
national treatment required that foreign banking organizations applying
to acquire U.S. companies bejudged against the same standards, including
the capital adequacy guidelines, as used to judge U.S. banking organi-
zations.
F. 1985 CAPITAL ADEQUACY GUIDELINES
On March 1, 1985, the Board tentatively adopted revised capital ade-
quacy guidelines. The final version of the guidelines was published in the
Federal Register of April 24, 1985.60 One issue not dealt with in the
guidelines is the treatment of foreign banking organizations. In supple-
mentary material released with the guidelines, the Board noted that it was
"discussing with foreign bank supervisors appropriate capital standards
for banks operating internationally." 6' Pending completion of those dis-
cussions, the Board stated that it would continue to review on a case-by-
case basis the financial condition, including the capital adequacy, of for-
eign banking organizations with U.S. operations. Particular scrutiny is to
be given to the capital of foreign banking organizations presenting the
Board with expansion proposals.
G. BOARD DECISIONS IN 1985
1. The Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan, 1985
On March 25, 1985, the Board approved an application by The Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan, Limited, Tokyo, Japan, to become a bank
holding company by expanding the activities of the limited-purpose trust
company for which it received approval in 1983.62 The 1983 action, dis-
cussed earlier in this section, did not make The Long-Term Credit Bank
60. 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057; 12 C.F.R. Part 225, App. A (1986).
61. 50 Fed. Reg. 16,063, April 24, 1985.
62. The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Limited. 71 FED. RES. BULL. 345 (May 1985).
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a U.S. bank holding company as the organization did not acquire a U.S.
bank. Thus, to convert the trust company to a bank, The Long-Term
Credit Bank had to make application under section 3(a)(l) of the Bank
Holding Company Act.
Capital concerns were mentioned by the Board in its rather brief de-
cision, but not in great detail. The Board noted that the primary capital
ratio of The Long-Term Credit Bank was below the minimum capital
guidelines established for U.S. multinational bank holding companies. The
only mitigating circumstance mentioned was that the bank will initially
be small in relation to The Long-Term Credit Bank, and will be strongly
capitalized. The Board also noted The Long-Term Credit Bank's com-
mitment to maintain the new bank among the more strongly capitalized
banking organizations of comparable size in the United States.
2. Creditanstalt-Bankverein, 1985
The Board approved the application of Creditanstalt-Bankverein of Vi-
enna, Austria, to acquire a U.S. investment advisory firm on November
7, 1985.63 The firm was McKenzie-Walker Investment Management, Inc.,
Larkspur, California. The application was under section 4(c)(8) of the
Bank Holding Company Act. McKenzie-Walker was an investment ad-
visor registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It pro-
vided portfolio investment advice to individuals, corporations, govern-
ments, and other institutions throughout the United States on both a
discretionary and a non-discretionary basis. Its activities were permissible
for U.S. bank holding companies.
Creditanstalt-Bankverein was the largest commercial bank in Austria,
with consolidated assets equivalent to approximately $17.8 billion as of
the end of 1984. It was subject to section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
Company Act because it had a branch in New York City.
Regarding the capital aspects of the transaction, the Board noted that
the Austrian bank's primary capital ratio as publicly reported was "well
below the Board's capital guidelines for U.S. multinational bank holding
companies." 64 Nevertheless, the Board found mitigating circumstances.
Specifically mentioned were the overall financial condition of the Bank
and its U.S. operations. Further, the Board noted that certain accounting
adjustments had been made, apparently with favorable results, to reflect
U.S. banking practices. Finally, the Board mentioned the service nature
of the nonbanking organization being acquired and the relatively small
size of Creditanstalt-Bankverein's investment.
63, Creditanstalt-Bankverein, 72 FED. RES. BULL. 63 (Jan. 1986).
64. Id.
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3. Industrial Bank of Japan, 1985
On November 29, 1985, the Board approved an application of The
Industrial Bank of Japan, Ltd., Tokyo, Japan, to acquire up to 75.1 percent
of the voting shares of J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust Company, New
York, New York. 65 IBJ was a U.S. bank holding company as a result of
its ownership of the Industrial Bank of Japan Trust Company in New
York. Thus the application was under section 3(a)(3) of the Bank Holding
Company Act.
IBJ was the largest of three-long term credit banks in Japan, and the
fifteenth largest banking organization in the world. It had assets equivalent
to approximately $85.7 billion. In addition to the New York trust company,
it had a branch in New York and an agency in Los Angeles.
J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust Company was the twenty-fourth larg-
est commercial bank in New York State and had total assets of approx-
imately $1.9 billion. Initially, IBJ was seeking to acquire 51 percent of
J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust from its parent holding company,
Schroders plc, London, England. An additional 24 percent would be ac-
quired within 18 months. As part of the transaction, IBJ was acquiring
two other organizations. One was J. Henry Schroder Banking Corpora-
tion, an investment company chartered under Article XII of the New York
Banking Law. This acquisition was under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank
Holding Company Act. The other organization being acquired was an
Edge Act corporation of J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust. This acqui-
sition was under the Edge Act, section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act.
Regarding the capital aspects of the transaction, the Board noted that
IBJ's primary capital ratio "as publicly reported is below the minimum
capital guidelines established by the Board for U.S. bank holding com-
panies." 66 As has come to be the norm, however, mitigating circumstances
were found. IBJ was in compliance with the capital and other financial
requirements of the Japanese supervisory authorities. Historically, it had
experienced relatively low loan losses and had maintained a strong li-
quidity position. It had a substantial and relatively stable funding base of
government and corporate deposits and medium- and long-term deben-
tures that, as a long-term credit bank, it was permitted to issue under
Japanese law. It had a substantial portfolio of securities of publicly held
Japanese companies that it carried at cost, which was substantially below
their current market value. Finally, the Board expressed satisfaction with
IBJ's existing U.S. operations and an expectation that IBJ would maintain
J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust among the more strongly capitalized
banking organizations of comparable size in the United States.
65. The Industrial Bank of Japan, Ltd., 72 FED. RES. BULL. 71 (Jan. 1986).
66. 72 FED. RES. BULL. 72 (Jan. 1986).
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As for the general problem of the capital positions of certain foreign
banking organizations, the Board noted that work was currently in prog-
ress among the foreign and domestic bank supervisory officials in various
countries to develop "more fully the concept of the functional equivalency
of capital ratios." 67 Pending the outcome of these efforts, the Board stated
it would continue to judge foreign bank applications on a case-by-case
basis.
Vice Chairman Preston Martin and Governor Emmett Rice concurred
in the decision but emphasized their concern about foreign banking or-
ganizations with publicly reported capital below the Board's capital guide-
lines. They said that permitting acquisitions by foreign banking organi-
zations with capital lower than U.S. peers would give these foreign
organizations an advantage in such areas as the pricing of services and
the bidding for domestic bank acquisitions. They concurred in the deci-
sion, however, because they apparently concluded that IBJ's capital po-
sition, after appropriate adjustments were made for differences between
foreign and domestic regulatory and banking practices and requirements,
was in line with the capital positions of similar U.S. banking organizations.
Governor Martha Seger dissented. She also expressed concern about
foreign banking organizations with publicly reported capital below the
levels of U.S. peers. Her main concern, however, seemed to be the issue
of reciprocity. U.S. banking organizations are in effect not permitted to
acquire sizable Japanese banking organizations. Consequently, Governor
Seger apparently did not feel that sizable Japanese banking organizations
should be able to acquire U.S. banking organizations.
H. 1986 RISK-BASED CAPITAL PROPOSALS
The three federal banking agencies-the Federal Reserve Board, the
OCC, and the FDIC-issued a joint statement on January 15, 1986, in
which they expressed the intention of seeking comments on proposed
standards for measuring capital on a risk-adjusted basis. The Federal
Reserve Board was first out of the blocks with its proposal, issuing them
for comment on the same day. 68 One reason given by the Board for the
issuance of the proposal was to bring the U.S. capital adequacy policies
more in line with those of other countries. The Board noted that many
European countries have developed risk-based capital measures, and that
Japanese supervisory authorities were moving in a similar direction. 69
67. Id.
68. 51 Fed. Reg. 3976, Jan. 31, 1986.
69. 51 Fed. Reg. 3977, Jan. 31, 1986.
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I. CURRENT STATUS
The Board's approach to the capital positions of foreign banking or-
ganizations with U.S. operations thus is still very much open. Consul-
tations with banking supervisors in other countries are in process. A goal
of these consultations appears to be the "functional equivalency of capital
ratios of different countries." Given the complexity of the issue and the
divergent approaches among the various nations, any sort of international
agreement would not appear to be on the near horizon. Tying required
capital levels to the riskiness of assets as called for in the Board's risk-
based capital proposal, however, might produce a greater degree of sim-
ilarity among the bank capital adequacy standards of the industrialized
countries than now exists.
II. Increased Interest in Capital Adequacy
The increased interest on the part of the Federal Reserve Board in the
capital positions of foreign banking organizations with U.S. banking op-
erations is not an isolated phenomenon. It is a reflection of the increased
interest in capital in general on the part of the three federal banking
regulators and the U.S. Congress.
A. 1981
Capital adequacy standards were adopted by the three federal banking
regulators-the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC and the FDIC-in 1981.70
The adoptions were against the background of rising Congressional clamor
on the subject. The Federal Reserve Board and the OCC joined together
in announcing capital adequacy standards. The FDIC, with its eye toward
the large number of relatively small banking organizations in its constit-
uency, went a somewhat different route.
In their guidelines, the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC looked at
two ratios of capital. These were (I) primary capital to total assets and
(2) total capital to total assets. Primary capital consisted of common stock,
perpetual preferred stock, capital surplus, undivided profits, reserves for
contingencies and other capital reserves, mandatory convertible instru-
ments, the allowance for possible loan and lease losses, and any minority
interest in the equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries. Total capital
included the primary capital components plus limited life preferred stock
and qualifying notes and debentures.
70. The Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency an-
nounced capital adequacy guidelines on December 17, 1981. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's guidelines were effective December 17, 1981.
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Institutions affected by the standards were categorized as regional or-
ganizations and community organizations. Regional organizations were
all institutions with assets in excess of $1 billion, except for the very
largest institutions, called multinational organizations. Community or-
ganizations were institutions with less than $1 billion in assets.
The Federal Reserve Board made another exception for bank holding
companies with assets of under $150 million. For these institutions, the
guidelines applied only if: (1) the company did not engage directly or
indirectly in any nonbanking activity involving significant leverage; and
(2) no significant amount of debt of the parent company or any nonbank
subsidiary was held by the general public.
The guidelines established a minimum level of primary to total assets
of 5 percent for regional banks and 6 percent for community banks. For
total capital to total assets, the guidelines set forth the following zones:
Regional Community
Zone I Above 6.5% Above 7.0%
Zone 2 5.5% to 6.5% 6.0% to 7.0%
Zone 3 Below 5.5% Below 6.0%
For banking institutions that operated in Zone 1, the regulator presumed
that capital was adequate if the primary capital ratio was acceptable and
above the minimum level. For institutions in Zone 2, the regulator pre-
sumed that an institution was undercapitalized, particularly if the primary
and total capital ratios were at or near the minimum guidelines. And for
institutions in Zone 3, the regulator strongly presumed that there was
undercapitalization.
In contrast to the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC, the FDIC looked
at only one capital ratio. This was adjusted equity capital to adjusted total
assets. Adjusted equity capital was equity capital minus assets classified
"loss" and one half of assets classified "doubtful." Adjusted total assets
were total assets minus assets classified "loss" and one half of assets
classified "doubtful." Equity capital included common stock, perpetual
preferred stock, capital surplus, undivided profits, contingency reserves,
other capital reserves, mandatory convertible instruments, and reserves
for loan losses. Limited life preferred stock and subordinated notes and
debentures were not considered in evaluating capital adequacy.




The ratios applied to all banks of which the FDIC was the primary reg-
ulator, regardless of size. The threshold level triggered a requirement for
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the submission by the bank of a comprehensive capital plan acceptable
to the FDIC and the state banking department. The minimum acceptable
level meant that the FDIC would insist on a specific program for promptly
remedying the equity capital deficiency.
B. 1982
In May of 1982, the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC issued criteria
on the classification of mandatory convertible securities as primary cap-
ital. 71 The criteria were in response to increasing use of such securities
by banking organizations. The two regulators stated that as a general
matter, the principal factor determining whether an issue qualified as
primary capital was the certainty with which it would be replaced by
permanent equity. In addition, the aggregate amount of mandatory con-
vertible securities qualifying as primary capital could not exceed 20 per-
cent of the other components of primary capital.
The OCC and the Board identified two types of mandatory convertible
securities as primary capital: securities with mandatory stock purchase
contracts and securities payable from the sale of common or perpetual
preferred stock. The former were also called equity notes and obligated
the holders to purchase stock in the issuing institution. To be considered
primary capital according to the OCC and the Board, equity notes had to
mature in twelve years or less. Further, if the stock purchase contracts
could be separated from the securities, a holder of a contract had to
provide sufficient collateral to the issuer to assure that the stock would
be purchased.
The second type of mandatory convertible securities-those payable
from the sale of common or perpetual preferred stock-involved notes
that obligated the issuer to sell stock in sufficient amounts to replace the
debt obligations. These securities, called equity commitment notes as
distinguished from equity notes, also had to mature within twelve years.
An issuer had to establish a sinking fund that would be added to in one-
third increments over the maturity period of the securities. That is, by
the time one-third of the life of the securities had run, the issuer had to
have paid into the fund from the sale of common or perpetual preferred
stock an amount equal to one-third of the securities' principal. A similar
amount in the fund was due at the two-thirds mark, and the final third
was due at least 60 days prior to maturity of the securities. The amount
of equity commitment notes counted as primary capital could not exceed
10 percent of the other components of primary capital.
71. May 26, 1982; see also announcements by the Board on Sept. 27, 1982, and the OCC
on Oct. 5, 1982.
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C. 1983
In 1983, two events of interest in the U.S. capital adequacy situation
occurred. On June 13, 1983, the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC
announced capital adequacy guidelines for multinational banking orga-
nizations. 72 The guidelines were the same as those adopted in 1981 for
regional banking organizations: a minimum primary capital to total assets
ratio of 5 percent, a minimum total capital to total assets ratio of 5.5
percent, and the zone concept for judging higher total capital to total
assets ratios. In conjunction with this action, the Board also added long-
term debt issued by parent bank holding companies or their nonbank
subsidiaries to the definition of total capital. Prior to this, only subordi-
nated debt issued by bank subsidiaries could be counted as a component
of holding company capital.
The second major 1983 action was the enactment of the International
Lending Supervision Act on November 30, 1983. 73 This law was aimed
at the activities and operations of banking organizations engaged in in-
ternational lending and was in large measure a response to the interna-
tional debt crisis that had surfaced the previous year. The more important
topics covered by the act were reserves against questionable international
loans, fees charged in connection with the restructuring of international
loans, data collection and disclosure, capital adequacy, and foreign loan
evaluations.
The capital adequacy provision was section 908(a) of the act. 74 This
section, as noted above, directs the federal banking agencies to "cause
banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by estab-
lishing minimum levels of capital for such banking institutions and by
using such other methods as the appropriate Federal banking agency deems
appropriate." Failure of a banking institution to maintain capital at or
above the minimal level may be deemed by the appropriate banking agency
to constitute an unsafe and unsound practice. The section also provides
that a regulator may issue a directive to a noncomplying banking insti-
tution. Such a directive can require the bank to submit a plan describing
the means by which, and the timing within which, the institution is to
achieve the required capital level. Progress in adhering to such a plan can
be considered by the regulator when it is asked to rule on any proposal
that would divert earnings, diminish capital, or otherwise impede the
banking institution's efforts to achieve its minimal capital level.
72. Press release of June 13, 1983.
73. Pub. L. No. 98-181, Title IX, 97 Stat. 1153 (1983).
74. 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a) (1982).
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D. 1984-1985
In part as a result of the impetus provided by the International Lending
Supervision Act, the three federal banking regulators proposed new cap-
ital adequacy standards in the summer of 1984. 7 5 The OCC and the FDIC
released their final capital adequacy regulations on March I1, 1985.76 The
final version of the Federal Reserve Board's guidelines was published on
April 24, 1985. 77 The Board did not raise its standards to the level of
regulations but kept them in guideline form.
Probably the most significant aspect of the new standards of the three
agencies is a general raising of the minimum acceptable capital ratios.
The minimum ratio of primary capital to assets is now 5.5 percent. The
minimum ratio of total capital to assets is now 6 percent. The standards
apply to all banks regardless of size. Thus the Federal Reserve Board and
the OCC have rejected their previous size distinctions. In its previous
guidelines, the FDIC did not make distinctions based on size.
Only the Federal Reserve Board now has a zone concept for the total
capital ratio. Previously, both the Board and the OCC used the concept.
The Board's new zones are as follows:
Total Capital to Assets
Zone I Above 7.0%
Zone 2 6.0% to 7.0%
Zone 3 Below 6.0%
Institutions in Zone I are generally considered by the Board to be ade-
quately capitalized. Institutions in Zone 2 may be considered to be ade-
quately capitalized if other relevant financial and managerial factors are
found to be fully satisfactory. And institutions in Zone 3 are considered
to be undercapitalized, absent extenuating circumstances.
All three agencies look at two types of capital: primary capital and
secondary capital. Primary capital consists of (1) common stock, (2) per-
petual preferred stock, (3) capital surplus, (4) undivided profits, (5) con-
tingency and other capital reserves, (6) certain mandatory convertible
instruments, (7) the allowance for possible loan and lease losses, and (8)
minority interests in equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries. Con-
cerning mandatory convertible instruments, no more than 20 percent of
primary capital may consist of these obligations. The OCC and the FDIC
also include net worth certificates in capital.
75. Federal Reserve Board-49 Fed. Reg. 30,317, July 30, 1984; FDIC--49 Fed. Reg.
29,399, July 20, 1984; OCC-49 Fed. Reg. 34,838, Sept. 4, 1984.
76. FDIC-50 Fed. Reg. 11,128, March 19, 1985, 12 C.F.R. Part 325 (1986); OCC-50
Fed. Reg. 10,207, March 14, 1985, 12 C.F.R. Parts 3 and 7 (1986).
77. 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057; 12 C.F.R. Part 225, App. A (1986).
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The FDIC and the OCC deduct all intangibles other than purchased
mortgage servicing rights from primary, and total, capital. For state mem-
ber banks, the only intangible the Board specifically deducts is goodwill.
Thus the Board not only excludes purchased mortgage servicing rights
from the deduction from capital, but also excludes other intangibles, such
as favorable leases. The Board does say that it may make adjustments to
a bank's capital ratios in instances where the amount of intangible assets
is in excess of 25 percent of tangible primary capital. For the guidelines
of all three agencies, the major import of the deduction of intangibles
from capital is that goodwill, which is an accounting result of most mergers
and acquisitions, is not counted as capital.
For bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve Board does not au-
tomatically exclude any intangible assets, including goodwill, from capital.
Nevertheless, those holding companies with aggregate intangible assets
in excess of 25 percent of tangible primary capital, or these institutions
with lesser, although still significant, amounts of goodwill will be subject
to "close scrutiny." 7 8 The Board states that it might make adjustments
to an organization's primary or total capital on a case-by-case basis when
the amount of intangible assets is in excess of 25 percent of tangible
primary capital. In reviewing acquisition proposals, the Board takes a
more stringent, although still unquantified, position. Its guidelines state:
"in reviewing acquisition proposals, the Board will take into consideration
both the stated primary capital ratio (that is, the ratio without any ad-
justment for intangible assets) and the primary capital ratio after deducting
intangibles." 79
The components of secondary capital for the three agencies are (I)
limited life preferred stock and (2) bank subordinated notes and deben-
tures. The Board also includes unsecured long-term debt of the parent
holding company and its nonbank subsidiaries. The OCC and the FDIC,
and the Board for state member banks, limit the amount of secondary
capital that can be counted as total capital to 50 percent of primary capital.
For all three agencies, secondary capital instruments must have a weighted
average maturity of at least seven years.
The OCC and the FDIC now exclude equity commitment notes-pre-
viously considered by the two agencies as a form of mandatory convertible
instruments-from primary capital. The Board, however, only makes the
exclusion for state member banks. Bank holding company primary capital
can still include equity commitment notes, to the extent of 10 percent of
primary capital. The 10 percent limitation was also in the Board's prior
guidelines.
78. 12 C.F.R. Part 225, App. A (1986).
79. Id.
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A principal characteristic of equity commitment notes is that an issuer
must replace them by the issuance of common or perpetual preferred
stock. The replacement must occur before the notes are repaid. The OCC
and the FDIC concluded that a troubled bank might not be able to issue
stock to replace the equity commitment notes. Thus, the notes' status as
capital is debatable, in their view.
Under the prior guidelines the FDIC was sort of the "odd man out."
The Federal Reserve Board now holds that distinction. The capital guide-
lines of the OCC, the FDIC, and in the case of state member banks, the
Board, are substantially identical. The Board, on the other hand, has not
promulgated its guidelines in the form of regulations, still maintains the
zone concept, and in the case of bank holding companies, does not exclude
equity commitment notes from primary capital or automatically deduct
goodwill from capital.
E. 1986
One of the criticisms of the 1985 capital adequacy standards is that they
take no explicit account of the riskiness of a bank's assets. In early 1986,
the three federal banking agencies moved to tie required levels of bank
capital to asset riskiness.-The Federal Reserve Board issued on January
15, 1986, for public comment, a proposal on the subject. 80 And on the
same day, the three agencies issued a joint statement in which they all
expressed the intention of seeking comments on proposed standards for
measuring capital on a risk-adjusted basis.
One reason for the interest of the U.S. banking regulators in risk-based
capital measures is the growth in off-balance-sheet activities by banking
organizations. As their name implies, such activities do not result in in-
creases in a bank's balance sheet, specifically the balance sheet's asset
side. Consequently, more off-balance-sheet activities do not result in the
need for more capital under the 1985 standards. According to the Board,
the amount of one type of off-balance-sheet activity, standby letters of
credit, increased for multinational banks from 5.8 percent of aggregated
assets at the end of 1981 to 11.4 percent of aggregated assets at mid-year
1985.
The Board's proposal calls for a risk-sensitive capital measure that
would supplement the 1985 capital adequacy standards. A new ratio of
primary capital to total assets adjusted for risk would be considered in
tandem with the 1985 minimum primary and total capital ratios. Under
the proposal, assets, both on and off the balance sheet, would be placed
in one of four categories: cash and cash equivalents; money market risk;
80. 51 Fed. Reg. 3976, Jan. 31, 1986.
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moderate risk; and standard risk. The risk weight assigned to each of the
categories would be as follows: cash and cash equivalents-0; money
market risk-0.30; moderate risk-0.60; and standard risk-Il.00. Off-
balance-sheet activities appear in each of the last three categories.
F. CONCLUSION
The Federal Reserve Board's interest in the capital adequacy of foreign
banking organizations with banking operations in the United States thus
is merely an aspect of a more general concern about capital adequacy.
This general concern is held not just by the Board but also by the other
two federal banking regulators and by the U.S. Congress. Consequently,
the Board's attitude in the future concerning foreign bank capital adequacy
will be heavily influenced by domestic developments.
This influence of the domestic situation on the banking regulators' view
of foreign institutions is evidenced by a regulatory amendment the FDIC
made in conjunction with its new capital regulations. The amendment
concerns the capital equivalency ledger account that U.S. branches of
foreign banks must maintain as a result of the International Banking Act
of 1978. Effective April 18, 1985, the capital equivalency ledger account
was raised from a minimum of 5 percent to 6 percent of a branch's lia-
bilities. 8 1 In the words of the FDIC, "This change corresponds to the
capital adequacy requirement of six percent of total assets being required
of well-managed domestic banks." 82
il1. The International Arena
Interest in the capital positions of banking organizations has not been
limited to the U.S. Congress and the regulatory and supervisory author-
ities in the United States. The difficulties of the first half of the 1980s
have caused banking authorities in a number of other countries to pay
more attention to capital levels. In the fall of 1984, the Basle Committee
on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices called for more strin-
gent capital guidelines. 8 3 The Basle Committee, also known as the Cooke
Committee, had its origins in the Franklin National Bank crisis of 1974.
One motivating factor for concern about capital levels for foreign banks
was the appreciation, until early 1985, of the dollar. Many foreign inter-
national banks have sizeable dollar assets and liabilities on their books.
Since their capital is usually denominated in the currencies of their home
81. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,142, March 19, 1985; 12 C.F.R. § 346.20 (1986).
82. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,142, March 19, 1985.
83. Andrews, The Desperate Search for Capital, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Int'l ed.),
Jan. 1985, at 53, 54.
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countries, these banks experience declining capital to asset ratios when
the dollar appreciates.
Increased concern about capital on the part of banking authorities in
many countries does not mean that agreement on appropriate capital levels
and how to achieve them is imminent. The difficulties arise from the
significantly different approaches to defining capital and to calculating
capital ratios in the various countries. For one thing, in many industrial-
ized countries, assets in capital to assets ratios are weighted according
to risk. A few countries, however, most notably the United States, use
unweighted assets as the denominator of capital to assets ratios, although,
as discussed in Part IL.E, above, the U.S. banking regulators are inves-
tigating the use of weighted assets.
As also indicated in the discussion in Part II.E of the Federal Reserve
Board's risk-based capital proposal, a growing matter of concern is off-
balance-sheet exposures, or contingent liabilities. These terms encompass
such things as standby credit lines, letters of credit, loan commitments,
prearranged note issuing facilities, revolving underwriting facilities, and
exposures in foreign exchange, futures, and options. Some foreign reg-
ulators require certain contingent liabilities to be added to assets in ar-
riving at the denominator of the capital to assets ratio. The United King-
dom and West Germany require 50 percent of certain guarantees to be
included in asset totals. In France, the proportion ranges between 25 and
50 percent. Canada requires 100 percent inclusion.
84
The definitions of capital among the various countries is similarly char-
acterized by considerable variation. In some countries, such as West
Germany, subordinated debt is not included within the definition of capital.
As discussed in Part I1, above, in the United States subordinated debt is
counted as capital, but only as secondary capital and only to the extent
of 20 percent of primary capital. The Bank of England limits the amount
of debt that can be counted as capital to 33 percent of total capital.
Switzerland limits the amount to approximately 10 percent of equity cap-
ital and taxed reserves. 85
Another item on which there is disagreement as to whether and to what
extent it should be included in capital is the loan loss reserve. Banks in
the United States can include loan loss reserves in capital. In other coun-
tries, however, such reserves are not given the full capital treatment.
86
And to mention just one more item concerning which there is disagree-
ment, to avoid double counting capital, the Bank of England requires
84. Id. at 56.
85. Id. at 55.
86. Id. at 56.
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banks to deduct from their capital the subordinated debt they hold of
other banks. 87
Thus there is a considerable lack of harmony among the capital re-
quirements of the banking authorities in the various nations of the world.
This lack of harmony is reflected in differing capital to assets ratios among
international banks. An accompanying table from an International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) publication gives some indication of both the differing
capital ratios and the divergent methods by which they are calculated.
One commentator has summed up the situation thusly: "one country may
require a lower ratio, but its banks are not necessarily weaker; they may
operate under a stricter definition of capital or their regulators might
include different factors in their asset totals." 88
Despite the difficulties in achieving a degree of harmony among the
differing approaches toward capital, the banking authorities in a number
of countries seem to be working toward that goal. And indeed, as indicated
above, the U.S. Congress has instructed the Federal Reserve Board to
pursue cooperative measures concerning capital with banking authorities
in other countries. This instruction was contained in section 908(b) of the
International Lending Act of 1983.89 The accompanying IMF table indi-
cates that there has been improvement in the capital positions of banks
in some countries. But a threshold issue remains, and that is whether
capital warrants the attention it is receiving.
IV. Some Thoughts on the Proper Role for
Capital in Bank Supervision and Regulation
In promulgating its capital adequacy regulations, the FDIC stated that
capital performs "several very important functions in banking institu-
tions. '90 According to the FDIC, capital absorbs fluctuations in income
to sustain banking institutions through periods of losses. It provides a
measure of assurance to the public. Supposedly, the public believes that
an institution with an appropriate level of capital, whatever that may be,
will continue to provide financial services during periods of financial dis-
tress. Consequently, capital helps to maintain confidence in individual
banking institutions and in the banking system as a whole. Capital serves
to support prudent growth. A corollary is that capital requirements serve
to restrain imprudent growth. And capital "provides protection to de-
positors in the event of a threatened insolvency." 9 1
87. Id.
88. Id. at 57.
89. 12 U.S.C. § 3107(b)(3)(C) (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
90. 50 Fed. Reg. 11,128, March 19, 1985.
91. Id.
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These justifications are not universally accepted. 92 Some commentators
have questioned whether the raising of required capital levels from, say,
5 percent to, say, 7 percent of assets really makes any difference. Capital's
ability to absorb losses and to protect depositors from insolvency is ne-
gated to a large extent if supervisory authorities do not let capital fall
below certain minimum levels. In other words, a minimum required level
of capital means that a bank with a lower ratio is, at least in the eyes of
the supervisors, approaching insolvency.
In the view of some, the quality of assets and the abilities of management
are much more appropriate focuses for regulatory and supervisory au-
thorities. An institution with a high capital ratio may actually be more
unstable and prone to troubles than an institution with a lower ratio if the
higher capital ratio institution has a larger percentage of questionable
assets. For example, a bank that invests only in U.S. Treasury bills would
appear to be a safe and sound institution even if it has close to zero
capital. The risk-based capital proposals put forth by the U.S. banking
agencies in early 1986 constitute one attempt to tie required capital levels
to the riskiness of a bank's assets. One early criticism of the proposals,
however, was that they do not focus on a particular bank's assets but on
broad asset categories and thus would only be marginally effective.
V. Conclusion
In a number of instances since 1983, the Federal Reserve Board has
expressed considerable concern about the capital positions of certain for-
eign banking organizations with operations in the United States. The
Board has not, however, rejected on capital adequacy grounds any ap-
plications by major foreign banking organizations.
The Board has indicated that it is investigating the matter of capital
with banking authorities in other countries. The results of this investi-
gation could lead to some sort of quantitative capital standards for mul-
tinational banking organizations. Thus far, however, the Board has es-
chewed the use of a single capital standard in judging foreign banking
organizations. A case-by-case approach has been followed. In view of
the considerable differences concerning banking capital standards among
the major countries of the world, it would appear that a case-by-case
approach will continue to be desirable.
This conclusion might be particularly attractive to those observers who
believe that the importance of capital has been overemphasized. At the
current time, the Board, and its fellow banking regulators, are enamored
92. See, e.g., Mingo, Capital Ratios: The Reg Q Fiasco of the Future? BANKING Ex-
PANSION REP., Jan. 21, 1985.
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with capital. Nevertheless, views on the role that capital is supposed to
play in the safety and soundness of banks might change in the years ahead.
If this occurs, a hard and fast agreement among the banking regulators
and supervisors in the various countries might become somewhat of an
embarrassment.
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